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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
XI. TRADEMARK
Pizzeria Uno Corporation v. Temple: Injunctive
Protection of Federally Registered Trademarks
To provide nationwide protection for federally registered trademarks,'
Congress passed the Federal Trademark Act of 1946.2 Congress recognized
that trademarks are essential for business competition because trademarks
identify a business' products, protect the public from confusion concerning
the source of goods, and promote the improved quality of products.3 Because
Congress believed that existing trademark statutes did not protect adequately
the trademarks used by expanding businesses in interstate commerce, Con-
gress intended the Lanham Act to increase protection of federally registered
trademarks beyond existing state common law protection.4 Section 22 of the
Lanham Act provides that federal registration of a trademark constitutes
constructive notice of federal registration to all future users of the same or
similar trademarks. 5 Section 22 thus eliminates the common law defense of
good faith subsequent use. 6 The good faith subsequent use defense provided
1. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1274, 1276 [hereinafter cited as 1946 SENATE REPORT]. The Committee on Patents
noted in the Senate Report that American business was no longer local in scope. Id. The
Committee, therefore, concluded that sound public policy required that trademarks used in
interstate commerce receive the greatest nationwide protection possible through federal regula-
tion. Id. The Congressional intent in adopting the Lanham Act was to foster the expansion of
business by providing nationwide protection of federally registered trademarks. In re Beatrice
Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 473 (C.C.P.A. 1960); see John R. Thompson Co. v. Halloway, 366
F.2d 108, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1966) (language of Lanham Act and its legislative history show
congressional intent to provide national trademark protection for expanding businesses); Sterling
Brewing Co. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp., 100 F. Supp. 412, 418 (D. Mass. 1951) (same).
2. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Lanham Act].
3. See 1946 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1275. The Committee on Patents noted in
the Senate Report that trademarks are essential in business competition because trademarks
enable buyers to distinguish among products of different merchants. Id. In addition, the
Committee on Patents noted that trademarks encourage manufacturers to maintain the quality
of their products by allowing manufacturers and merchants to benefit from a good reputation
and consumer loyalty. Id. Also, trademarks protect the public from deceit about the source of
goods. Id.
4. Id. at 1276-77. The Committee on Patents noted in the Senate Report that no federal
common law existed and that the rights of a trademark owner under the common law of one
state were different from the trademark owner's rights in another state. Id. To improve the pro-
tection of trademarks used in interstate commerce, the Committee on Patents suggested federal
legislation to protect trademarks used in interstate commerce. Id.
5. Lanham Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1982).
6. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959).
In Dawn Donut Co. v.Hart's Food Stores, Inc., the Second Circuit noted that the Lanham Act
prevents a good faith defense by a user who adopts the mark after registration because the
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that if a subsequent user in a remote geographic market adopted the use of
a federally registered trademark, in good faith and without knowledge of
the federal registration, the subsequent user gained the right to use the
trademark in the subsequent user's geographic market.7 By providing
constructive notice to all subsequent users of the same or confusingly similar
trademarks, section 22 of the Lanham Act protects a federal registrant from
claims of good faith subsequent use by persons in other geographic locales.'
Injunctive protection of a registered trademark, however, is not auto-
matic under the Lanham Act. 9 To enjoin the subsequent use of a federally
registered trademark by an alleged infringer, section 32(1) of the Lanham
Act requires a federal registrant to show that the subsequent use of a
registered trademark is likely to cause public confusion concerning the source
of the registrant's goods.'0 The Fourth Circuit in Pizzeria Uno v. Temple"
recently addressed the question of when the owner of a federally registered
trademark can enjoin an unauthorized user 2 of the registered trademark in
subsequent user had constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership. Id.; see infra
note 7 and accompanying text (explaining good faith subsequent use defense).
7. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916); United Drug Co.
v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918). Under the two landmark United States
Supreme Court cases, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf and United Drug Co. v. Rectanus
Co., a subsequent user of a mark in a geographically remote market will prevail over a senior
user if the subsequent user adopted the mark in good faith and without knowledge of its prior
use in another market. Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 420; Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 103.
8. See supra note 6 (discussing that § 22 of Lanham Act eliminated good faith subsequent
use defense).
9. See Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act
(Act) provides that if any person uses a registered trademark without the consent of the
registrant, and such use is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive," then
that person will be subject to the remedies provided in the Act. Id. The registrant cannot
recover profits or damages unless the registrant can show that the infringer committed the acts
of infringement with the intention to cause confusion or deceive. Id. If a registrant cannot
prove an intent to deceive, the registrant is limited to obtaining injunctive relief. Id.; see
Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 639-41 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (test for injunctive relief set
out in § 32(1) of Lanham Act is whether use of trademark by alleged infringer is likely to cause
confusion). Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act provides that a registrant may enjoin the subsequent
use of a trademark that creates a likelihood of public confusion concerning the origin of
products. Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1959).
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of § 32(1) of Lanham
Act for injunctive protection of federally registered trademarks).
11. 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984).
12. See Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1525-26 (involving unauthorized use of registered
trademark in which defendant Temple began using mark after registration and without
permission of Pizzeria Uno). An unauthorized user is a person who adopts after registration
and without the consent of the registrant a trademark identical to or confusingly similar to a
federally registered trademark. See id.; Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358,
364 (1959). In Dawn Donut, the Second Circuit referred to a person who-uses a registered
trademark, or a confusingly similar mark, without the consent of the registrant and subsequent
to the mark's registration, as a "subsequent user" and an "unauthorized user." Dawn Donut,
267 F.2d at 364.
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a geographic area outside of the federal registrant's existing market area. 3
In Pizzeria Uno, the Pizzeria Uno Corporation (Pizzeria Uno) was the
owner of the registered trademark "Pizzeria Uno."' 4 The trademark had
been in continuous use since Ike Sewell and his partner, Ric Riccardo, opened
the original Pizzeria Uno restaurant in 1943.'5 Pizzeria Uno developed a
well-known reputation as a full service restaurant specializing in deep-dish
style pizzas.' 6 The restaurant received favorable national publicity in news-
papers and televised news programs. 6 On April 11, 1978, the Patent and
Trademark Office' granted Pizzeria Uno's predecessor in title registration
of the trademark "Pizzeria Uno."' 9 As of 1983, Pizzeria Uno had planned
to open 120 to 150 new franchises within the next five years, had received
several inquiries from persons interested in obtaining a franchise in South
Carolina, and had interviewed two prospective franchisees from Columbia,
South Carolina.20 Additionally, a Pizzeria Uno employee resided in South
Carolina to negotiate with prospective franchisees. 2' Pizzeria Uno and Piz-
zeria Uno's franchisees had a substantial interest in protecting the trademark
"Pizzeria Uno" because the Pizzeria Uno franchise required an initial
investment of approximately one million dollars and subsequent royalty
payments of 5% of gross sales.
2 2
James W. Temple, Jr. owned two restaurants located in Columbia and
Sumter, South Carolina, which served fast food, Mexican-style. 23 In July
1981 Temple began using the trademark "Taco Uno" to identify his restau-
13. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1525-26.
14. Pizzeria Uno Corp, v. Temple, 566 F. Supp. 385, 386 (C.D.S.C. 1983).
15. Id. at 387.
16. Id. In Pizzeria Uno, the District Court for the District of South Carolina found that
Pizzeria Uno employed hosts, waiters, and bartenders to provide full service sit-down dining.
Id. Take-out orders also were available at Pizzeria Uno restaurants. Id.
17. See Brief of Appellant at 22, Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir.
1984). Appellant's brief in Pizzeria Uno stated that Pizzeria Uno's national reputation was
widespread and that the restaurant had achieved considerable fame. Id. Appellant's brief also
stated that Pizzeria Uno's national publicity included a spot on the "Today Show" in which
Tom Brokaw interviewed a Chattanooga, Tennessee woman who had been attracted to the
Chicago restaurant. Id.
18. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing Patent ard Trademark Office's
role in registering trademarks).
19. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1525.
20. Pizzeria Uno, 566 F. Supp. at 386-88. In Pizzeria Uno, the District Court for the
District of South Carolina found that Pizzeria Uno was seeking franchisees throughout the
United States and had considered two inquiries from potential franchisees in Columbia, South
Carolina. Id.
21. Id. at 388. In Pizzeria Uno, the District Court for District of South Carolina found
that Pizzeria Uno had placed an employee in South Carolina to negotiate with potential
franchisees. Id.
22. Id. at 387-88.
23. See id. at 388. The district court in Pizzeria Uno found that Temple's restaurants
were fast-food operations specializing in Mexican food in which patrons ordered food at a
counter and then took the food to tables in the restaurant or left with the food and ate
elsewhere. Id.
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rants in Columbia and Sumter, South Carolina.24 In August 1981 Temple
applied to the Patent and Trademark Office to register the trademark "Taco
Uno" in connection with his restaurant services.25 The Patent and Trademark
Office refused to register the trademark "Taco Uno" because of Pizzeria
Uno's prior registration.26 Temple petitioned for reconsideration of the Patent
and Trademark Office's decision to refuse registration. 27
Before the Patent and Trademark Office could hold a hearing to
reconsider registration of the trademark "Taco Uno," Pizzeria Uno filed
suit against Temple in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, alleging that Temple's use of the mark "Taco Uno" was
infringing Pizzeria Uno's federally registered trademark in violation of
section 32(1) of the Lanham Act. 2 Pizzeria Uno also alleged false designation
of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 29 and unfair competition
under the common law of South Carolina. a0 After a bench trial, the district
court found that both words comprising the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" were
descriptive 3' and that Pizzeria Uno had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
public confusion between the trademarks "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno."
3 2
24. Id.
25. Id. at 389.
26. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1525. In Pizzeria Uno, the Patent and Trademark Office
issued Temple a letter dated March 16, 1982, stating that the Patent and Trademark Office was
refusing registration of Temple's mark because of a previous registration for the mark "Pizzeria
Uno." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1525-26; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing § 32(l) of the
Lanham Act).
29. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1524; see Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
Section 43(a) provides that any person who falsely describes goods or misrepresents the origin
of goods "shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely
indicated" or by anyone likely to be damaged by the false description or misrepresentation. Id.
30. See Pizzeria Uno, 566 F. Supp. at 399. In Pizzeria Uno, the District Court for the
District of South Carolina concluded that an action for unfair competition under South Carolina
common law was basically the same as a federal trademark infringement action under the
Lanham Act. Id.
31. Id. at 395; see infra note 40 (discussing descriptive classification of trademarks).
32. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1526. In reaching the conclusion that Temple did not
infringe Pizzeria Uno's trademark, the District Court for the District of South Carolina in
Pizzeria Uno based its decision on several findings of fact. Id. First, the district court found
that the dominant term in both marks was "Uno." Id. Second, the district court found that
"Uno" was a descriptive mark without secondary meaning. Id. Third, the district court found
that the operation of the two businesses was not similar. Id. Fourth, although the district court
found that both businesses used similar advertising media, the district court noted that the
advertising markets were separated geographically because Pizzeria Uno's closest restaurant to
Temple's restaurants was Atlanta, Georgia. Id. Consequently, the district court found that
consumer confusion from advertising was unlikely. Id. Finally, the district court found no
intent by Temple to infringe Pizzeria Uno's trademark nor any actual confusion between the
marks. Id. Consequently, the district court concluded that Temple had not infringed Pizzeria Uno's
mark and dismissed the case. Id. On appeal, Pizzeria Uno challenged the district court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Id.
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As a result, the district court found no trademark infringement by Temple
and dismissed the case on its merits.
3
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
noted that to grant injunctive protection for a federally registered trademark,
section 32 of the Lanham Act requires a registered trademark owner to show
that an alleged infringer's use of the registered trademark is likely to cause
confusion in the buying public. 4 The Pizzeria Uno court determined that
the Fifth Circuit had established the appropriate guidelines for deciding
whether a likelihood of confusion exists in Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan
Research & Development, Inc.." The Sun-Fun guidelines provide that a court
must consider the distinctiveness of the contested trademark, the similarities
between the two trademarks, the similarity of the products or services
associated with the two trademarks, the similarity of the parties' business
facilities, the similarities in advertising used by the parties, the defendant's
intent in adopting the trademark, and the existence of actual confusion
created by concurrent use of the two marks. 36 The Fourth Circuit cautioned,
however, that not all of these elements are relevant in every case involving
trademark infringement.17 The Pizzeria Uno court stated that the distinctive-
ness of the two marks is the paramount element for determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists between the two marks. 38 According to the
Fourth Circuit, the primary disagreement between the parties concerning the
distinctiveness of the trademarks was whether Pizzeria Uno's trademark was
descriptive or suggestive. 39 The Pizzeria Uno court noted that the importance
of the dispute concerning whether the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" was
descriptive or suggestive lay in the degree of protection afforded to trade-
marks in the respective classifications. 40 The Fourth Circuit stated that if the
33. Pizzeria Uno, 566 F. Supp. at 399.
34. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining
statutory prerequisites for injunctive relief in § 32(1) of Lanham Act).
35. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527; see Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Resarch & Dev.
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981) (establishing seven elements as general guide to make
likelihood of confusion determination).
36. Sun-Fun, 656 F.2d at 189.
37. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527; see Modular Cinemas of Am., Inc. v. Mini Cinemas
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (cautioning that not all Sun-Fun elements are
relevant or entitled to equal weight in every case).
38. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527.
39. Id.; see infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing definition of descriptive and
suggestive marks).
40. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at -1527; see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). The Abercrombie court noted that courts classify marks into
four categories, which roughly reflect their distinctiveness and eligibility as trademarks. Aber-
crombie, 537 F.2d at 9. The classifications of trademarks are generic, descriptive, suggestive,
and arbitrary. Id. These classifications overlap one another and trademarks can fall into
different categories depending on the products associated with the mark. Id. For example,
"ivory" is generic when used to describe products made from the tusks of an elephant, but
arbitrary when used in connection with soap products. Id. at 9 n.6. A generic mark is a mark
that describes a type or class of products. Id. at 9. The Abercrombie court offered the analogy
19861
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trademark "Pizzeria Uno" was suggestive, then the trademark would be
protectable under the Lanham Act. 4' If "Pizzeria Uno" was descriptive,
however, the trademark would not be registerable under the Lanham Act,
unless Pizzeria Uno could show that the trademark had acquired a secondary
meaning in the buying public. 42 Additionally, according to the Fourth Circuit,
federal registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the trademark owner's
right to exclusive use of the registered trademark in connection with the goods
or services specified in the registration.
43
In surveying the approaches generally taken by courts to decide whether
that a generic mark is a genus of which the particular product is a species. Id. Generic marks
are inherently nondistinctive and cannot be registered under the Lanham Act. Id. Furthermore,
if a mark ever becomes "the common descriptive name of an article or substance," § 14(c) of
the Lanham Act requires cancellation of the federal registration. Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(c) (1982). A descriptive mark ordinarily describes the size, qualities, or desirable
characteristic of a product or service. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. For example, the trademark
"Deep Bowl Spoon" would be descriptive when applied to spoons because the trademark
informs the consumer of the proportions of the spoon, deep and bowl-shaped. Fletcher, The
Pestlur Case-Collateral Estoppel Effect of CCPA and 7TAB Decisions-Actual Confusion as to
Incontestability of Descriptive Marks, 64 TRADEMaRK REP. 252, 260 (1974). The trademark is
not generic because the product described is not a deep bowl, but a spoon. Id. Section 2(e) of
the Lanham Act, however, forbids the registration of marks that are merely descriptive. Lanham
Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). The Lanham Act makes an exception to prohibiting the
registration of descriptive marks if a merely descriptive mark acquires secondary meaning in
the buying public. Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0. Section 2(f) allows the registration
of a mark that "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." Lanham Act §
2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). A descriptive mark acquires secondary meaning when consumers
recognize the mark as identifying only one source of a product. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
For example, in Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., the United States
Supreme Court held that although the trademark "Nu-Enamel" was descriptive of enamel
paints, Nu-Enamel Corporation deserved exclusive use of the mark because customers associated
the Nu-Enamel Corporation's trademark with goods manufactured by Nu-Enamel Corporation.
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 335-36 (1938). A sug-
gestive mark, however, is inherently distinctive and, therefore, automatically registerable under the
Lanham Act. Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. A
suggestive mark does not convey directly characteristics of a product, but requires the use of
the consumer's imagination or association to discern the attributes of the product. General Shoe
Corp. v. Rosen, Ill F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1940). For example, the mark "Skinvisible" does
not describe immediately transparent medical adhesive tape, but requires the customer to
associate the terms "invisible" and "skin" with the product, transparent medical adhesive tape.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
Arbitrary and fanciful marks are inherently distinctive and have the same rights as suggestive
marks. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. A fanciful mark is a name or symbol invented for use as
a trademark, like Kodak or Xerox. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 n. 12. An arbitrary mark is an
ordinary word associated with goods or services in an unfamiliar context. Id. For example, the
term "ivory" is arbitrary when associated with soap products. Id. at 9 n.6. See generally I J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 31:1-:26, at 431-517 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing classification of trademarks into categories of distinctiveness).
41. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527; see supra note 40 and accompanying test (discussing
descriptive and suggestive classifications of trademarks).
42. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527-28; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing
descriptive and suggestive classifications of trademarks).
43. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1529.
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
a trademark is descriptive or suggestive, the Fourth Circuit discerned several
considerations affecting the descriptive-suggestive determination. 44 The Piz-
zeria Uno court first noted that courts usually distinguish between the
classifications of descriptive and suggestive marks by making a facial com-
parison of the terms "descriptive" and "suggestive. ' 45 Examining several
definitions courts have formulated to differentiate the descriptive and sugges-
tive classifications, the Fourth Circuit noted that courts generally have
defined a descriptive mark as one that identifies qualities or characteristics
of a product.4 6 Courts have defined a suggestive mark as one that requires
a consumer to use the consumer's imagination to form a conclusion con-
cerning the nature of the goods associated with a trademark.47 Second, the
Pizzeria Uno court observed that registration without the Patent and Trade-
mark Office requiring proof of secondary meaning creates a rebuttable
presumption that the trademark is suggestive and, therefore, entitled to
protection under the Lanham Act s.4 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Patent
44. Id. at 1527.
45. Id. at 1528; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing descriptive and
suggestive classifications of trademarks).
46. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1528; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing
descriptive and suggestive classifications of trademarks); infra note 47 and accompanying text
(same).
47. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1528; see Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178,
1183 (5th Cir. 1980) (descriptive term is one that identifies quality or characteristic of article or
service and suggestive term is one that suggests characteristics of goods to which term applies),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379
(7th Cir.) (descriptive mark imparts information about product directly to customer, while
suggestive term requires customer to use customer's imagination to connect information with
product), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1976); supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing
descriptive and suggestive classifications of trademarks).
48. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1528-29. Under the Lanham Act, the Patent and Trademark
Office is the administrative agency charged with registering trademarks. Lanham Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 (1982). The Patent and Trademark Office must determine the proper classification
of a trademark because the Patent and Trademark Office cannot register a merely descriptive
mark. Del Laboratories, Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 780 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). The Patent and Trademark Office can,
however, register a descriptive mark if the mark acquires a secondary meaning in the buying
public. Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982). A descriptive trademark acquires
secondary meaning when the mark is distinctive of the registrant's products. Id. If the Patent
and Trademark Office allows registration of a trademark without proof of secondary meaning,
the Patent and Trademark Office has concluded that the trademark is suggestive and not
descriptive. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 378 (7th Cir. 1976). A
court must consider as prima facie correct the Patent and Trademark Office's decision to
register a trademark as suggestive. Id. The determination by the Patent and Trademark Office
will not preclude a third party from challenging the validity of the trademark after registration.
Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 373 (1st Cir. 1980). On registration of the
trademark, however, the burden of proof concerning the registrant's exclusive right to use of
the trademark shifts to the party challenging the validity of the mark. Id. The party challenging
the registered trademark owner's presumptive right to exclusive use of the mark must overcome
the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Vuitton et fils S.A. v. J. Young Enter.,
Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1981). A registered mark, however, becomes incontestable
19861
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and Trademark Office will not register a descriptive mark unless the applicant
for registration demonstrates that his mark has acquired secondary meaning. 49
Third, the Fourth Circuit discerned that although courts generally focus on
the word not disclaimed as the dominant term in a composite mark when
making the descriptive-suggestive determination, courts always consider the
entire trademark to decide whether a composite mark is descriptive or
suggestive. 0 Fourth, the Pizzeria Uno court stated that courts also examine
the frequency with which the dominant term of a particular trademark
appears in other trademarks. 5' When the dominant term of a particular
trademark appears frequently in other trademarks, the Fourth Circuit noted
that courts usually find that the dominant term is descriptive. 52 Finally, the
Pizzeria Uno court examined the proper application of the doctrine of
foreign equivalents. 3 The Fourth Circuit observed that courts considering a
trademark composed of a foreign word usually translate the foreign word
into English. 54 If the translation of the foreign word describes a product or
after five continuous years in use without a final decision adverse to the registrant. Lanham
Act § 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1982). If a trademark owner's right to use the mark is incontestable,
registration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's right to use the mark. Id.
49. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances in which Patent
and Trademark Office will grant registration to descriptive mark).
50. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1530; see Continental Scale Corp. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l., Inc. 517 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (courts should not give disclaimed terms
same weight as dominant terms when making likelihood of confusion test, but courts should
consider entire trademark); American Drill Bushing Co. v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 342 F.2d 1019, 1021
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (same); American Throwing Co. v. Famous Bathrobe Co., 250 F.2d 377, 382
(C.C.P.A. 1957) (Hatfield, J., concurring) (when mark consists of two words, one disclaimed
and other one not, word not disclaimed is critical term for descriptiveness-suggestiveness deter-
mination). Section 6 of the Lanham Act expressly authorizes the registration of trademarks with
disclaimed terms. Lanham Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1056 (1982). In In re Franklin Press, the Court
of Custom and Patent Appeals noted that when a registrant disclaims a term in a trademark,
the registrant relinquishes any exclusive appropriation of the disclaimed term beyond its use as
part of the trademark. In re Franklin Press, 597 F.2d 270, 273 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
51. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1530-31; see Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615
F.2d 252, 259-60 (5th Cir.) (Amstar court held that numerous identical trademarks already in
use by different businesses reduce likelihood of confusion, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980);
Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 1941) (because 98
existing trademarks included the term "arrow," Arrow court found minimal threat of danger
to plaintiff's reputation through confusion about source or sponsorship of plaintiff's goods);
King-Size, Inc. v. Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1157 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(because numerous other retailers use description "king size" in referring to oversized men's
clothing, King-Size court determined that trademark was descriptive and had not acquired
secondary meaning).
52. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1530-31; see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing
trademark infringement cases involving dominant terms that frequently appear in other trade-
marks or product descriptions).
53. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1531-32; see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text
(discussing doctrine of foreign equivalents).
54. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1531-32; see Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel and
Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (under doctrine of foreign equivalents, courts
translate foreign word into English and then test English translation for descriptiveness or
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is equivalent to an existing trademark in English, then courts consider the
mark non-distinctive and not entitled to protection without proof of second-
ary meaning.
5
Based on the court's views of general trademark law, the Fourth Circuit
adopted certain rules to guide courts in deciding whether a trademark is
descriptive or suggestive.16 First, a court should ascertain whether the mark
describes characteristics of the goods or whether the mark merely "intimates
or suggests" an idea of the product. Second, when dealing with a composite
mark, a court should focus on the dominant word, giving minimum consid-
eration to any disclaimed words, especially if a disclaimed word is descrip-
suggestiveness); Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665, 667 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(same); I J. McCARrY, supra note 40, § 11:14, at 464-65 (foreign words are translated into
English and then tested for descriptiveness or suggestiveness by determining whether people in
buying public who are familiar with foreign language would consider mark descriptive).
55. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1531-32; see Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289
F.2d 665, 667 (C.C.P.A. 1961). In Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, the Bart Schwartz
court noted that the term "fiocco" designated rayon in Italian tariff regulations. Bart Schwartz,
289 F.2d at 667-68. The Bart Schwartz court concluded that under the doctrine of foreign
equivalents "fiocco" was the equivalent of rayon, and, therefore, unregistrable because the
term was descriptive of rayon. Id. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, the Ninth
Circuit court found the term "volkswagon" translated into "Peoples Car." Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 256 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 411 F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1969). As a result, the Volkswagenwerk court held that the term "volkswagen" was a
common descriptive name of a popular, low priced car and declined to protect the mark. Id.
In McKesson & Robbins v. Charles H. Phillips Chem. Co., the Second Circuit held that the
mark "Leche de Magnesia" translated into Milk of Magnesia. McKesson & Robbins v. Charles
H. Phillips Chem. Co., 53 F.2d 1011, 1011-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 552 (1932).
Noting that "Leche de Magnesia" when translated into English was the same as a widely known
American trademark, the McKesson & Robbins court held that the term was descriptive and,
therefore, unregistrable. Id. In In re Maclin-Zimmer-McGill Tobacco Co., the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the Spanish word "El Gallo" means rooster
in English and found the mark unregistrable because the mark conflicted with the existing
American trademark "The Rooster" and created a likelihood of confusion. In re Maclin-
Zimmer-McGill Tobacco Co., 262 F. 635, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1920). But see Sarkli Ltd., 721 F.2d
353, 353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Sarkli, the Federal Circuit found no likelihood of confusion
between "Repechage" and "Second Chance." Id. Although the word "repechage" had con-
notations of "second chance," the Sarkli court held that repechage was not the equivalent of
"second chance" because of differences in the terms' appearance and pronunciatioii. Id.
Similarly, in Continental Nut Co. v. Le Cordon Bleu, the Continental Nut court found on the
basis of dictionary definitions in Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language that the terms "cordon bleu" and "blue ribbon" did not have the same meaning to
the American public. Continental Nut Co. v. Le Cordon Blue, 494 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A.
1974). Consequently, the Continental Nut court found no harm to the owner of the "Blue
Ribbon" trademark by registering the trademark "Le Cordon Bleu." Id. See generally 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 11:14, at 466 (doctrine of foreign equivalents should apply only
in situations when translation of foreign word is equivalent to existing trademark or descriptive
of product).
56. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533.
57. Id.; see supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing differences between different
categories of trademarks).
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tive.58 Third, a court should note the frequency with which other trademarks
or product descriptions employ the dominant term. 9 Fourth, if the trademark
under consideration is a foreign word, courts should consider the applicability
of the doctrine of foreign equivalents.6° Finally, courts should give weight to
the Patent and Trademark Office's determination of whether the trademark
is descriptive or suggestive.
6'
Under the Fourth Circuit's guidelines for determining whether a trade-
mark is descriptive or suggestive, the Pizzeria Uno court held that the district
court clearly erred in finding that the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" was
descriptive. 62 In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit identified "Uno"
as the dominant term in both "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno."'63 The
Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the district court's finding that the term
"UNO" is in common use in the English language merely because the term
appears in an English dictionary as the acronym for the United Nations
Organization." In the Fourth Circuit's view, the parties never intended their
use of "Uno" to refer to the United Nations Organization." Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that other trademarks and product descriptions
do not use extensively the dominant term "Uno."" Consequently, the Pizzeria
58. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533; see supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing
consideration given to disclaimed words when making descriptive-suggestive determination).
59. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533; see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing
descriptive-suggestive determination of dominant terms frequently used in other trademarks).
60. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533; see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text
(discussing doctrine of foreign equivalents).
61. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533; see supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing
consideration by courts of Patent and Trademark Office's decision that mark is descriptive or
suggestive).
62. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533. The Pizzeria Uno court stated that the proper
standard for appellate review of a district court's findings of fact in trademark cases is the
clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1526. The Pizzeria Uno court noted that some courts have
applied different standards of review for subsidiary and ultimate findings of fact in trademark
infringement cases. Id. The Fourth Circuit decided, however, that the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Pullman-Standard v. Swint eliminated any distinction between subsidiary
and ultimate findings of fact in the application of the clearly erroneous standard to findings of
fact in federal trademark infringement cases. Id.; see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
286-87 (1982) (clearly erroneous standard applies to all findings of fact, both subsidiary and
ultimate); cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (federal
circuit court entitled to determine that federal district court's decision is clearly erroneous when
no evidence in record supports district court's findings or when circuit court has strong conviction
that district court made mistake); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1978) (same);
Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 703 (4th Cir. 1977) (same), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 938-39 n.13 (lth
Cir.) (clearly erroneous standard does not protect findings made by application of incorrect
legal standards or in disregard of applicable legal standards), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983).
63. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1533. In Pizzeria Uno, the Fourth Circuit identified "Uno"
as the dominant term in the trademarks "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno" because the parties
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Uno court concluded that the term "Uno" is not a commonly used word in
the English language.
67
In applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents to the trademark "Pizzeria
Uno," the Fourth Circuit found that "Uno" translates into "one. ' 6 The
Pizzeria Uno court disagreed with the district court's finding that the term
"Uno" translates into "number one," and is, therefore, synonymous with
"the best." 69 The Fourth Circuit found that "Uno" does not mean "the
best" in either Italian or Latin, and the public who understands Latin or
Italian would not consider the term "Uno" to mean "the best. ' 70 So, the
Fourth Circuit did not consider the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" descriptive
of the "best" pizzeria.
7'
Finally, the Pizzeria Uno court noted that the Patent and Trademark
Office granted Pizzeria Uno's trademark registration without requiring Piz-
zeria Uno to prove that the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" had acquired second-
ary meaning.7 2 The Fourth Circuit held that the registration by the Patent
and Trademark Office was a prima facie determination that the trademark
"Pizzeria Uno" was suggestive.73 As a result, Temple had the burden of
proving that the mark was not suggestive.7 4 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that Temple failed to rebut the presumption created by the Patent and
Trademark Office's determination that "Pizzeria Uno" was a suggestive
trademark .7  Relying solely on the Sun-Fun element of the trademarks'
distinctiveness, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in
finding that Pizzeria Uno was not a suggestive trademark.7 6 The Pizzeria
Uno court noted that the district court had considered other elements outlined
in Sun-Fun to determine whether Pizzeria Uno was distinctive, but had




68. Id. at 1533-34.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1533.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1534.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. In Pizzeria Uno, the Fourth Circuit observed that "Uno" was arguably an arbitrary
mark when applied to Italian restaurants. Id. at 1534 n.9. If "Uno" were an arbitrary term
when applied to restaurant services, the trademark "Pizzeria Uno" would be inherently
distinctive and entitled to the greatest protection possible. Id.; see Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (1982). Because Pizzeria Uno never argued that "Uno" was arbitrary or fanciful, the
Pizzeria Uno court declined to consider the issue. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534 n.9.
76. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534.
77. See id. at 1534-35. Although the Fourth Circuit in Pizzeria Uno did not consider the
other Sun-Fun elements material to the resolution of the Pizzeria Uno dispute, the Fourth
circuit discussed the other Sun-Fun factors because the district court had considered them. Id.;
see Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981) (estab-
lishing seven elements as general guide to make likelihood of confusion determination); see supra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing factors outlined in Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Sun-
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Although the Fourth Circuit determined that Pizzeria Uno was a properly
registered trademark and, therefore, entitled to protection under the Lanham
Act, the Pizzeria Uno court concluded that Pizzeria Uno presently could not
enjoin Temple's use of the trademark "Taco Uno. ' 78 Relying on Fourth
Circuit's decision in Armand's Subway, Inc. v. Doctor's Associates, Inc.,7 9
the Pizzeria Uno court found that a registered trademark does not entitle
the owner to injunctive relief absent actual competition between the registered
trademark owner and the alleged infringer in the geographic area in which
the alleged infringer operates. 80
Unfortunately, the statutory requirements in section 32(1) of the Lanham
Act and the landmark case of Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. do
not support the Fourth Circuit's holding in Pizzeria Uno, requiring actual
competition in the alleged infringer's geographic market as a prerequisite for
tan Research & Dev. Inc. for determining whether trademark is descriptive or suggestive). In
applying the Sun-Fun elements addressed by the district court, the Fourth Circuit first examined
whether the marks were similar. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534. The Fourth Circuit found that
because the dominant term "Uno" in both "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno" is the same, the
marks are similar in both sound and appearance. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the strong
similarity between "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno" is likely to cause consumers to confuse
the source of Temple's restaurant services. Id. In examining the similarity of the goods or services
that the trademarks identify, the Fourth Circuit compared the Pizzeria Uno dispute with a similar
dispute in Clinton Detergent Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534-35;
see Clinton Detergent Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 302 F.2d 745, 748 (C.C.P.A. 1962). In
the Clinton case, the Clinton court found that Carjoy car cleaner and Joy dish detergent were
similar products. Id. Although the products were intended for different purposes, the Clinton
court found a similarity in the products because dish detergents can be used to clean cars and
vice-versa. Id. The Fourth Circuit found the difference, therefore, between Pizzeria Uno's full
service dining and Taco Uno's fast-food service insignificant in comparison to the difference
between the products involved in the Clinton case. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1535. The Pizzeria
Uno court found a similarity between Pizzeria Uno's and Temple's services because both
businesses provided food services. Id. The Fourth Circuit considered the advertising media
employed by both parties to be similar, but did not consider the similarity of advertising used
by the parties important because of the present absence of geographic overlap in the parties'
advertising markets. Id. Finally, the Pizzeria Uno court noted that the intent of the alleged
infringer is not a defense for creating actual confusion or a likelihood of confusion in the
buying public concerning the source of goods. Id. Based on the Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that the concurrent use of the trademarks "Pizzeria Uno" and "Taco Uno" would create a
likelihood of confusion, the Fourth Circuit disregarded the issue of Temple's intent in adopting
the trademark "Taco Uno." Id.
78. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1536.
79. 604 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1979).
80. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1536. In Pizzeria Uno, the Fourth Circuit cited Armand's
Subway, Inc. v. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. for the proposition that a registered trademark owner is
not entitled to injunctive relief except in areas 'actually penetrated by' the alleged infringer.
Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1536; Armand's Subway, Inc. v. Doctor's Assoc., Inc., 604 F.2d
849, 851 (4th Cir. 1979). The Armand's holding appears to require actual geographic competition
between the parties in the same geographic area. See Armand's, 604 F.2d at 849-51 (holding
that registrant would not be entitled to injunctive relief except in geographic market areas
actually penetrated by registrant).
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injunctive protection." In Dawn Donut, the Second Circuit outlined the
standard for awarding a registrant injunctive relief against the unauthorized
use of a confusingly similar trademark in a remote geographic area. 2 The
Dawn Donut court noted that to enjoin an unauthorized user under section
32(1) of the Lanham Act, a registrant must show only that the unauthorized
use of a registered trademark creates a likelihood of public confusion
concerning the source of the products associated with the trademark.83 The
Dawn Donut court stated that for a registered trademark owner to enjoin
an unauthorized user in a remote geographic market, the registrant does not
have to prove actual competition between the two marks in the remote
geographic market. 84 The registrant must show only that the registrant is
likely to expand his use of the trademark into the unauthorized user's market
area.85
In Dawn Donut, Dawn Donut Company, Inc. (Dawn Donut), a wholesale
distributer of doughnuts and other baked goods, sued to enjoin Hart's Food
Stores, Inc. (Hart) from using Dawn Donut's federally registered trademarks
"Dawn" and "Dawn Donut."' 86 The Second Circuit found that Dawn Donut
had confined Dawn Donut's use of the marks to a geographic area outside
of Hart's retail market and was not likely to move into Hart's geographic
market.8 The Dawn Donut court, therefore, denied Dawn Donut's request
for injunctive relief.88 The Second Circuit held that when a federal registrant
confines his use of a mark to a particular geographic market, with no
likelihood of the registrant expanding into an unauthorized user's market,
then the registrant cannot obtain injunctive relief.8 9 The Dawn Donut court
noted, however, that when a registrant does show a likelihood of expansion
into the unauthorized user's market, then the registrant can obtain injunctive
relief. 9o
81. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1954); see infra text accompanying notes 82-85 (discussing
holding in Dawn Donut); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing statutory requirements
established in § 32(a) of Lanham Act for injunctive protection of federally registered trade-
marks).
82. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364-65; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory requirements established in § 32(a) of Lanham Act for injunctive protection of federally
registered trademarks).
83. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory requirements established in § 32(a) of Lanham Act for injunctive protection of federally
registered trademarks).
84. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364 n.4; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory requirements established in § 32(a) of Lanham Act for injunctive protection of federally
registered trademarks).
85. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364 n.4; see supra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing
Dawn Donut requirements for federal registrant to obtain injunctive protection of federally
registered trademark).
86. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 361.
87. Id. at 365.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 364.
90. Id. at 364 n.4.
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Although not all of the federal circuits have addressed the issue of when
a registered trademark owner can enjoin the unauthorized use of a registered
trademark in a remote geographic market, most of the circuits that have
addressed the issue follow the Dawn Donut formulation requiring a registrant
to show only a likelihood of expansion into a remote geographic to obtain
injunctive protection.9' For example, in American Foods, Inc. v. Golden
Flake, Inc.,92 the Fifth Circuit cited the Dawn Donut holding with approval.
93
In American Foods, the plaintiff, Golden Flake, Inc. (Golden Flake), owned
a registered trademark of the words "Golden Flake" in connection with the
sale of potato chips. 94 In 1961 the defendant, American Foods, Inc. (Amer-
ican Foods) began using the term "Golden Flake" for the sale of dinner
rolls. 95 Golden Flake sued American Foods for trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act alleging that American Foods' use of the trademark created
confusion in the buying public concerning the source of goods produced by
Golden Flake.96 The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
enjoined American Foods' use of the trademark in Golden Flake's existing
market area, but denied Golden Flake's request for an injunction in the
remaining areas of the United States. 97 In affirming the district court's
decision, the Fifth Circuit applied the Dawn Donut rule. 9 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that because Golden Flake produced no proof of probable expan-
sion beyond Golden Flake's existing market, Golden Flake could not obtain
injunctive relief outside of that market. 99 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
91. See Mr. Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969)
(following Dawn Donut); Continente v. Continente, 378 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1967) (same);
infra text accompanying notes 101-105 (discussing holding in Continente); John R. Thompson
Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 114 (5th Cir. 1966) (following Dawn Donut); American Foods,
Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1963) (following Dawn Donut); infra
text accompanying notes 92-100 (discussing holding in Golden Flake). In Mr. Donut of Am. v.
Mr. Donut, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a federal registrant is entitled to injunctive relief
under the Lanham Act when the registrant has expanded his business to a point when the use
of confusingly similar marks is no longer confined to separate and distinct markets. Mr. Donut,
418 F.2d at 844. In John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, the Fifth Circuit denied plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief against an unauthorized user of two federal trademark registrations
of the mark "Holloway House." John R. Thompson Co., 366 F.2d at 114. Applying the Dawn
Donut test, the Thompson court found that Thompson had no enforceable rights in the area
in which Holloway operated his business because Thompson produced no evidence of foreseeable
expansion into Holloway's geographic market. Id.
92. 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963).
93. Id. at 626.
94. Id. at 622.
95. Id. In Golden Flake, Golden Flake, Inc. (Golden Flake) had been selling potato chips
and horseradish in Alabama under the trademark "Golden Flake" since 1936. Id. In 1961,
American Foods, Inc. (American Foods) began using the expression "Golden Flake" in
connection with the sales of dinner roles in Alabama and surrounding areas. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 626; see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Dawn
Donut).
99. See Golden Flake, 312 F.2d at 626. In Golden Flake, the Fourth Circuit noted that
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dismissal was without prejudice to Golden Flake and that Golden Flake
could seek injunctive relief against American Goods in other geographic
areas should Golden Flake later decide to expand its geographic markets.: °
The Ninth Circuit in Continente v. Continente'0' similarly applied the
Dawn Donut rule to a case involving the protection of a federally registered
trademark against unauthorized use in a remote geographic market.'02 In
Continente, Rosa Continente sued her brother-in-law, John A. Continente,
for infringement of the trademark "Continente" in connection with the sale
of grapes.103 Although both parties grew their grapes in the same region, the
Ninth Circuit found that customers were not likely to confuse the suppliers
of the grapes because the parties sold their grapes in two separate geographic
markets, New York City and Vancouver, British Columbia.'04 Because the
plaintiff, Rosa Continente, failed to produce evidence showing a likelihood
of expanding her sales of grapes into British Columbia, the Ninth Circuit
applied the Dawn Donut test and denied her request for injunctive relief. 05
Unlike the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit has not
followed Dawn Donut.' In Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 
07
Holiday Inns of America, Inc. (Holiday Inns), a rapidly expanding corpo-
ration, sued B & B Corporation (B&B) to enjoin B&B's use of Holiday Inns'
registered mark in connection with B&B's motel in St. Thomas, Virgin
Islands.'10 Holiday Inns produced evidence of two applications for franchises
in the Virgin Islands to demonstrate Holiday Inns' plan to expand into the U.S.
Virgin Islands.' 9 The District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St.
Thomas and St. John, granted Holiday Inns' motion for summary judgment
and enjoined B&B's use of the mark "Holiday Inns."" 0 Although the Third
Circuit agreed that Holiday Inns had a protectable interest in the registered
mark, the Third Circuit denied Holiday Inns' request for injunctive relief."'
The Third Circuit held that a court must limit the use of injunctive relief to
situations in which the plaintiff faces immediate and irreparable harm." 2
after 38 years of doing business, Golden Flake still conducted 95 percent of its business in
Alabama and showed no evidence of future expansion. Id. at 625.
100. Id. at 626.
101. 378 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 279-81.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 282.
105. Id. at 282-83.
106. See Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 n.13 (5th Cir. 1966)
(declining to follow Dawn Donut).
107. 409 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969).
108. Id. at 615. In Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B Corp., Holiday Inns of America,
Inc. (Holiday Inns) had registered a service mark pursuant to § 1127 of the Lanham Act. Id.
The Holiday Inns court noted that the legal effect of registering a service mark under the
Lanham Act is identical to that of registering a trademark. Id. at 615 n.l.
109. Id. at 618.
110. Id. at 615.
111. Id. at 618.
112. Id.
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Although the Third Circuit noted that Holiday Inns had established a strong
case to support a future likelihood of confusion when the two marks began
competing in the same market area," 3 the Third Circuit required an additional
showing of actual competition in the same geographic market." 4 As a result,
the Holiday Inns court concluded that a likelihood of confusion would exist
only when Holiday Inns commenced operations in the Virgin Islands, and
only then Holiday Inns could enjoin B&B's use of Holiday Inns' mark." 5
Both the Holiday Inns and Pizzeria Uno decisions implicitly require
actual confusion in the buying public before a federal registrant can obtain
injunctive protection of the trademark." 6 Commentators agree, however,
that the Third and Fourth Circuits' approach for protecting trademarks is
unsatisfactory." 7 Commentators have noted that a growing business with
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 618-19.
116. See Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1536 (denying injunctive protection of registered
trademark absent competition between marks in unauthorized user's market area); Holiday
Inns, 409 F.2d at 618-19 (denying Holiday Inns injunctive protection of registered service mark in
Virgin Islands until Holiday Inns commences operations in Virgin Islands). In Pizzeria Uno,
the Fourth Circuit found that the concurrent use of the two trademarks "Pizzeria Uno" and
"Taco Uno" was likely to create confusion. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1535-36. Pizzeria Uno
also produced strong evidence of Pizzeria Uno's probable expansion into the Columbia, South
Carolina market, including two applications for franchises in Columbia. Pizzeria Uno, 566 F.
Supp. at 388. Ignoring Pizzeria Uno's evidence of probable expansion into the South Carolina
market, the Fourth Circuit refused injunctive relief until Pizzeria Uno actually established a
business in South Carolina. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d 1536. As a result, the Fourth Circuit forces
Pizzeria Uno to wait until Pizzeria Uno can show actual competition between the marks, and,
therefore, actual confusion between the marks. Similarly, the Third Circuit denied Holiday Inns
of America, Inc. (Holiday Inns) injunctive protection of Holiday Inns' mark from unauthorized
use of the mark "Holiday Inn," by B & B Corporation (B&B) in the Virgin Islands until Holiday
Inns commenced operation of a motel in the Virgin Islands. Holiday Inns, 409 F.2d at 618-19.
Although the Holiday Inns court noted that Holiday Inns had established a strong case to
support a future likelihood of confusion when the marks began actual competition, the Third
Circuit denied injunctive protection of Holiday Inns' mark. Id. The holdings in both cases
require more than a likelihood of confusion and seem to require actual confusion created by
actual competition between two marks.
117. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 40, § 26:14 at 319. McCarthy questions the decision
of the Third Circuit in Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B, Inc., in which the Third Circuit
refused to enjoin B&B's use of Holiday Inns' registered mark in connection with a motel in the
Virgin Islands until Holiday Inns commenced the construction of a motel in the Virgin Islands. Id.
McCarthy suggests that the Third Circuit's holding in Holiday Inns changes the Lanham Act's
requirement for injunctive protection of a registered trademark from a likelihood of public
confusion concerning the source of goods or services to a requirement that the unauthorized
use of a registered mark creates actual confusion. Id. When a registrant shows a likelihood of
expansion into a remote geographic area, McCarthy finds no reason to defer injunctive
protection until the registrant actually has commenced operations in the geographic area. Id.
Another commentator suggests that the Third Circuit's decision in Holiday Inns misapplies the
principles of trademark protection established in Dawn Donut and forces a registrant to face
the risk of an unfavorable reputation created by an unauthorized user. Comment, The Scope
of Territorial Protection of Trademarks, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 805 (1970).
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plans to move into a new geographic market unnecessarily may face an
unfavorable reputation created by an unauthorized user."
8
By holding that injunctive relief is not proper absent actual competition
between a registrant and an unauthorized user in the same geographic area,
the Fourth Circuit implicitly establishes a requirement of actual geographic
comdle-tition and actual confusion, contrary to the principles of trademark
protection enunciated in Dawn Donut and the Lanham Act." 9 Dawn
Donut established that the Lanham Act affords protection to registered
trademark owners upon a showing that the registrant is likely to expand his
use of the trademark into an unauthorized user's market, even though no
present competition exists between the registrant and the unauthorized user.
20
The effect of the Pizzeria Uno court's holding is to require a federal registrant
to show actual confusion in a remote geographic area to obtain injunctive
relief, although the Lanham Act only requires a showing of the likelihood
of confusion.'' Furthermore, Congress intended that the Lanham Act would
provide federally registered trademarks with the greatest possible nationwide
protection to foster the growth of expanding businesses. 122 The Fourth
Circuit's holding in Pizzeria Uno, however, impairs trademark protection
for expanding businesses by allowing unauthorized users to taint prospective
markets prior to the registrant's imminent expansion into the market. The
Fourth Circuit, therefore, should promote the public policy of the Lanham
Act by granting injunctive relief to registered trademark owners in remote
geographic markets whenever registrants can prove a likelihood of expansion
into the geographic market.
DANIEL J. FETTERMAN
118. Cf. Holiday Inns, 409 F.2d at 618 (Holiday Inns unable to obtain injunctive protection
until commencing operations in market area of infringer); see supra note 117 and accompanying
text (discussing commentators' criticisms of Third Circuit's holding in Holiday Inns of America,
Inc. v. B & B Corp.).
119. See Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1524, 1536 (denying injunctive protection absent actual
competition between trademarks in same geographic area); Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364 n.4
(establishing likelihood of expansion as prerequisite for injunctive protection of federally
registered trademark in remote geographic areas); supra note 116 and accompanying text
(discussing that Fourth Circuit's holding in Pizzeria Uno creates actual confusion requirement
for injunctive protection of trademark against infringement in remote geographic area).
120. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364; see supra text accompanying notes 82-85 (discussing
holding in Dawn Donut).
121. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing that Fourth Circuit's holding
in Pizzeria Uno creates actual confusion requirement for injunctive protection of trademark
against infringement in remote geographic area); Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
122. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent of Lanham
Act).
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